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ABSTRACT 
This thesis postulates that in today’s media environment and, with 
adversaries skillfully using propaganda to skirt nation’s resolve, Perception 
Management is key to military success and should, therefore, be an Information 
Operations (IO) Core Capability vis-à-vis its current consideration in the U.S. 
doctrine as related IO capability. 
The Kargil episode of 1999 was a political victory for India, while, from the 
Pakistani perspective, it was a successful tactical operation - albeit one which 
was not accompanied by a coordinated politico-diplomatic plan - turned into a 
politico-diplomatic setback. Pakistan’s tactical successes in Kargil were not 
translated into strategic gains due to the lack of clarity over policy and, hence, no 
real Perception Management offensive mounted. On the contrary, India hyped 
the situation with the West using its media as a key element of Perception 
Management to win substantial political support. Eventually, Pakistani forces had 
to withdraw in the face of immense international pressures.  
As only the Indian disinformation of Kargil was publicized and myths were 
promoted, the real history of Kargil became obscured. It is a central aim of this 
thesis to present the Pakistani case, to set the record, if not exactly straight, then 
to provide a balancing viewpoint through Pakistani eyes.  
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in character 
of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the 
changes occur. 
Giulio Douhet 
A. FOREWORD  
Over the last few decades, the world has experienced an information 
explosion. The bang is all about the exchange of information in real time and its 
usage to perform diverse functions. The effects of the boom have been felt in all 
walks of life – from politics to business, from education to international affairs, 
from sciences to art, from media to industry, from military to clergy, and so on. 
The theory that information is a vital tool with the power of combat weaponry is 
now a demonstrated reality.  
The information revolution has also changed the way nations fight war. 
Conflicts have increasingly become contests over information and information 
systems. The ultimate aim is to penetrate the adversary’s decision cycle and that 
can only be enabled through effective collection and collation of information. Mao 
TseTung1 once said that in order to win victory one must try his best to seal the 
eyes and ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to create confusion 
in the minds of enemy commanders, driving them insane. His statement 
addresses what we see as Perception Management (PM) or influence 
operations. The concept of Perception Management is not something new, but 
the technology to support this concept and the resulting outcomes are of great 
interest today. Joseph S Nye, Jr notes that currently more focus is on the use of 
Hard Power (a theory that describes using military and economic means to 
influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies) and the efficacy and 
                                            




utility of Soft Power (the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and 
the values that underlie them -- power that comes from diplomacy, culture and 
history), is being ignored by the powerful in the world. The resultant outcomes 
are in front of our eyes and the problem of terrorism is now far graver than it was 
before 2001. The current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of 
civilizations; rather, it is a contest closely tied to the civil war raging within Islamic 
civilization between moderates and extremists. The United States and its allies 
will win only if they adopt policies that appeal to those moderates and use public 
diplomacy effectively to communicate that appeal.  
Perception Management is not limited to the enemy; in fact, it is equally 
important in shaping the opinion of domestic and international audiences and in 
projecting the “true story.” When perceptions are not managed and truth is not 
told and all that one hears is repeated lies, there comes a time when reality, even 
if told, is not believed and is overcome by fallacies. It is all about influence. 
Warfare in the information age has placed greater emphasis on 
influencing political and military leaders, as well as populations, to resolve 
conflict. Information technology (IT) has increased access to the means to 
directly influence the populations and its leaders. Therefore, in today’s 
environment the way forward is “Perception Management.” 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW  
1. Scope of the Study 
This thesis postulates that in today’s media environment and, with 
adversaries skillfully using propaganda to skirt a nation’s resolve, Perception 
Management is key to military success. It should, therefore, be an Information 
Operations (IO) Core capability vis-à-vis its current consideration as related IO 
capability. This study remains within the bounds of existing U.S. Doctrine for 
Information Operations (IO) and its efficacy / applicability as seen in the South 
Asian context.  This includes how Perception Management (PM) is a vital 
3 
concept and therein media is a crucial tool. This is vital in the Pakistan India 
scenario, especially in the context of the Kargil Conflict of 1999. 
2. Structure of the Study 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I provides an overview of 
the thesis. The second chapter gives a background of the key concepts, based 
on existing U.S. Doctrine, such as what is information, its essentials, what 
constitutes information environment, the concept of Information Operations (IO), 
and its effects and capabilities encompassing core, supporting and related IO 
capabilities. The third chapter explains the concept of Perception Management 
(PM). It elaborates on the need for PM, principles, tools, objectives, and the use 
of PM. The fourth chapter discusses media as “the tool” of PM in the South Asian 
environment and its efficacy. Chapter V takes on the Indo-Pak Kargil conflict of 
1999 as a case study, endorsing the earlier concept that Pakistan’s failure of not 
successfully using PM enabled Indians to transform a “tactical failure” into a 
“strategic / diplomatic victory.” Pakistan had to pay the price for not getting their 
story out. As only the Indian “one-sided reporting” of Kargil was publicized, the 
real history of Kargil became obscured. The final chapter endeavors to draw 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. KEY CONCEPTS 
1. Information and its Essentials 
Before discussing Information Operations, and getting into the key 
concept of Perception Management, it is essential to define what is meant by the 
term “Information.” According to Joint Publication 1-02 (Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 2006), “Information is facts, 
data, or instructions in any medium or form.” Information is, also, “the meaning 
that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their 
representation.” As outlined in JP 6-0 (Joint Communications System, March 
2006), there are two basic uses for information. “The first is to help create 
situational awareness (SA) as the basis for a decision. The second is to direct 
and to coordinate actions in the execution of the decision. The information 
system must present information in a form that is both quickly understood and 
useful to the recipient. Many sources of information are imperfect and susceptible 
to distortion and deception.” The seven criteria shown in Figure 1 help 
characterize information quality.  
Combining pieces of information with context produces ideas or provides 
knowledge. Good information management (IM) makes accomplishment of other 
tasks less complex. Today, improved technology in mobility, weapons, sensors, 
and communications continues to reduce reaction time, increase the tempo of 
operations, and generate large amounts of information. If information is not well 




Figure 1.   Information Quality Criteria as appeared in JP 6-0 
 
2. Information Environment 
As outlined in JP 3-13 (Information Operations, February 2006), “the 
information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and 
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The actors 
include leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources 
include the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, apply, or 
7 
disseminate information. The information environment is where humans and 
automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is, 
therefore, the principal environment of decision making. The information 
environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, 
and cognitive. 
• Physical Dimension. The physical dimension is composed of the 
command and control (C2) systems, and supporting infrastructures 
that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations 
across air, land, sea, and space domains. It is, also, the dimension 
where physical platforms and the communications networks that 
connect them reside. This includes the means of transmission, 
infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. 
Comparatively, the elements of this dimension are the easiest to 
measure, and, consequently, combat power has traditionally been 
measured primarily in this dimension. 
• The Informational Dimension. The informational dimension is 
where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, 
displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2 of 
modern military forces is communicated, and where the 
commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists of the content and flow 
of information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that 
must be protected. 
• The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses 
the mind of the decision maker and the target audience (TA). This 
is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualize, and 
decide. It is the most important of the three dimensions. This 
dimension is, also, affected by a commander’s orders, training, and 
other personal motivations. Battles and campaigns can be lost in 
the cognitive dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit 
cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, 
situational awareness, as well as public opinion, perceptions, 
media, public information, and rumors influence this dimension.” 
Advancements in technology have enabled information to be collected, 
processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected outside the cognitive 
process in quantities and at speeds that were previously unimagined. While 
technology makes great quantities of information available to audiences 
worldwide, perception-effecting factors provide the context which individuals use 
to translate data into information and knowledge. The finite amount of time and 
resources available to obtain information must be considered. 
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B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) 
Information Operations (IO) are integral to the successful execution of 
military operations. A key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain information 
superiority. Information superiority provides a competitive advantage only when it 
is effectively translated into superior decisions. According to JP 3-13 (Information 
Operations, February 2006), “IO are described as the integrated employment of 
electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological 
operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security 
(OPSEC). This is in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to 
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-
making while protecting our own.” If we break the definition down and get rid of 
the commas, we come up with IO being the integrated employment of various 
capabilities to affect decisions. So, the focus of IO, by definition, is on decision-
making and since decisions are based on available information, the IO goal 
becomes one of doing something to information in order to help cause decisions 
favorable to one’s own objectives. It should be kept in mind that there is an 
offensive (...adversarial...) and defensive (...while protecting our own...) 
component to the definition. This makes the management of one’s own 
information as important as disrupting the information management of the 
enemy.2 To achieve this, Perception Management is vital. The overall Information 
Operations conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 2. 
                                            




Figure 2.   Information Operations Conceptual Framework (After: Information 
Operations Primer, U.S. Army War College, January 2006) 
 
C. IO EFFECTS 
Success in military operations depends on collecting and integrating 
essential information while denying it to the adversary and other target 
audiences. According to JP 3-13, IO can affect data, information, and knowledge 
in three basic ways: 
• By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that 
add, modify, or remove information from the environment of various 
individuals or groups of decision makers. 
• By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, 
communicates, processes, and/or stores information in support of 
targeted decision makers.  
• By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use 
data, information, and knowledge. 
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D. EMPLOYMENT OF IO 
All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive 
operations. Commanders use IO capabilities in both areas of operation 
simultaneously to accomplish the mission, increase their force effectiveness, and 
to protect their organizations and systems. Fully integrating IO capabilities for 
offensive and defensive operations requires planners to treat IO as a single 
function. Commanders can use IO capabilities, as outlined in JP 3-13, to 
accomplish the following: 
• Destroy. To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot 
perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without 
being entirely rebuilt. 
• Disrupt. To break or interrupt the flow of information. 
• Degrade. To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 
or communications systems, and information collection efforts or 
means. IO can, also, degrade the morale of a unit, reduce the 
target’s worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisions 
and actions. 
• Deny. To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical 
information, systems, and services. 
• Deceive. To cause a person to believe what is not true. Military 
Deception (MILDEC) seeks to mislead adversary decision makers 
by manipulating their perception of reality. 
• Exploit. To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect 
information or to plant false or misleading information. 
• Influence. To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to own 
forces. 
• Protect. To take action to guard against espionage or capture of 
sensitive equipment and information. 
• Detect. To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of 
an intrusion into information systems. 
• Restore. To bring information and information systems back to 
their original state. 
• Respond. To react quickly to an adversary’s or others’ IO attack or 
intrusion. 
11 
E. CORE IO CAPABILITIES 
The IO core capabilities, as outlined in JP 3-13, are: Psychological 
Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), Operations Security 
(OPSEC), Electronic Warfare (EW), and Computer Network Operations (CNO). 
1. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected truthful or untruthful 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of their governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or 
reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.3 
2. Military Deception (MILDEC) 
MILDEC is described as being those actions executed to deliberately 
mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, 
and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or 
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’ 
mission. MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrect analysis, causing the adversary 
to arrive at specific false deductions. To be effective, a MILDEC operation must 
be susceptible to adversary collection systems and “seen” as credible to the 
enemy.4 
3. Operations Security (OPSEC) 
OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and, subsequently, 
analyzing friendly actions and other activities. The purposes are to identify what 
friendly information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently accurate 
knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary decision makers 
critical information about friendly forces and intentions; and to cause adversary 
decision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly information 
                                            
3 For more details on PSYOP, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Joint Doctrine for 
Psychological Operations. 
4 For more details on MILDEC, see JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. 
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(because other information about friendly forces and intentions remains secure). 
OPSEC seeks to deny real information to an adversary, and to prevent correct 
deduction of friendly plans.5 
4. Electronic Warfare (EW) 
EW refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) 
and directed energy to control the EM spectrum or to attack the adversary. EW 
includes three major subdivisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection 
(EP), and electronic warfare support (ES).6 
5. Computer Network Operations (CNO) 
CNO stems from the increasing use of networked computers and 
supporting IT infrastructure systems both by military and civilian organizations. 
For the purpose of military operations, CNO are divided into Computer Network 
Attack (CNA), Computer Network Defense (CND), and related Computer 
Network Exploitation (CNE), enabling operations.7 
F. SUPPORTING IO CAPABILITIES 
According to JP 3-13, there are five supporting IO capabilities: Information 
Assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, Counterintelligence (CI), and 
Combat Camera (COMCAM). 
1. Information Assurance (IA) 
IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
                                            
5 For more detail on OPSEC, see JP 3-54, Operations Security. 
6 For more detail on EW, see JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare. 
7 The doctrinal use of CNO capabilities in support of IO is discussed further in Appendix A, 
“Supplemental Guidance,” to JP 3-13. 
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information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority.8 
2. Physical Security 
Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures 
designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 
installations, material, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, 
sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security process includes determining 
vulnerabilities to known threats, applying appropriate deterrent, control and 
denial safeguarding techniques and measures, and responding to changing 
conditions.9 
3. Physical Attack (Kinetic) 
Physical attack disrupts, damages, or destroys adversary targets through 
destructive power. Physical attack can, also, be used to create or alter adversary 
perceptions or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable information systems. 
4. Counterintelligence (CI) 
CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect 
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations 
conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements, organizations, 
persons, or international terrorist activities. 
5. Combat Camera (COMCAM) 
The COMCAM provides an imagery capability in support of operational 
and planning requirements across the range of military operations. COMCAM is 
responsible for rapid development and dissemination of products that support 
strategic and operational IO objectives. 
                                            
8 For detailed policy guidance, see DOD Directive (DODD) 8500.1, Information Assurance 
(IA), DOD Instruction (DODI) 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation. 
9 For more discussion on physical security, see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 
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G. RELATED IO CAPABILITIES 
There are three related IO capabilities, as outlined in JP 3-13: Public 
Affairs (PA), Civil-Military Operations (CMO), and Defense Support to Public 
Diplomacy (DSPD). 
1. Public Affairs (PA) 
PA includes public information, command information, and community 
relations activities directed toward both external and internal audiences with 
interest in Department of Defense (DOD). PA is essential for information 
superiority, and credible PA operations are necessary to support the 
commander’s mission and to maintain essential public liaisons.10 
2. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) 
CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, 
or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental 
civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace. They are 
conducted across the range of military operations to address root causes of 
instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster, or may be conducted 
independent of other military operations to support national security objectives. 
CMO can occur in friendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas to facilitate 
military operations and to achieve objectives.11 
3. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) 
DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by DOD components, not 
solely in the area of IO, but to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of 
the government.12 
The IO capabilities are summarized in Figure 3. 
                                            
10 For more details on PA, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 
11 For more details on CMO, see JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. 
12 For more details on DSPD, see DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO). 
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Figure 3.   IO Capabilities 
 
IO is normally performed by military forces at both the operational and 
tactical levels. IO at the strategic level is a critical component of strategic 
communication. An additional distinction, which may be helpful, is to further 
categorize the IO capabilities into those which are primarily “influential” in nature 
or “Soft Power” (MILDEP, PSYOP, PA, CMO, DSPD) and those which are more 
“technical (or electronic)” in nature (EW and CNO, etc.). Some distinctions are 
helpful “conceptually” while still appreciating the fact that the real power of IO 
comes from their integrated application. 
Having discussed IO and its various capabilities, based on existing U.S. 
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III. PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (PM) 
A. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION 
In today’s information age, Perception Management (PM) is widely 
practiced and has become an increasingly important tool of warfare and 
peacemaking. It is important to first understand the term perception. Callamari 
and Reveron argue that according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
definition, 
Perception, the process of forming images of the world, can be 
thought of as involving two sub-processes. Sensory data is first 
acquired, then [it is] organized and analyzed to form a coherent, 
comprehensive picture. Thus, misperception of the world can arise 
either from incorrect data, or from mal-processing of correct data.13 
The subsequent question then is what does Perception Management 
entail? Joint Publication 1-02 (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms - April 2006) defines Perception Management as follows: 
Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators 
to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and 
objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders 
at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in 
foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s 
objectives. In various ways, Perception Management combines 
truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and 
psychological operations. 
Siegel argues that this definition of PM focuses on deliberate actions to 
influence rather than the totality of one’s activities and others’ perceptions of you 
in terms of influencing their views. A critical part of PM is efforts to understand 
others’ perceptions and basis for those perceptions. The same could be used to 
effect the Perception Management planning process.14 
                                            
13 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development, Misperception 
Literature Survey (Princeton, NJ: Mathtech, 1979), p. 5. 
14 Pascale Combelles Siegel, Perception Management: IO’s Stepchild? Accessed 20 April 
2007. Available http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a727554648~db=all. 
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Perception Management deals primarily with the international political 
environment. It is significant across the conflict spectrum from peacetime to and 
beyond the outbreak of hostilities. PM is a vital dimension for resolving crisis 
situations and could immensely change the outcomes of “Low Intensity 
Conflicts”, such as the Kargil Conflict. Many peace operations commanders have 
emphasized the role of information as a non-lethal weapons system. Finally, PM 
is a crucial tool in combat missions.15 It must be born in mind that the target 
audience is, also, responsible for interpretation of the false / inaccurate data, and 
is, thus, an unaware participant in Perception Management. As will be shown in 
the later part of this thesis, this was the case with the West during the 1999 Indo-
Pak Kargil Conflict.  As a wartime use example, propaganda efforts (influence 
operations) during World War II were critical to lowering the morale of Japanese 
forces. During Desert Storm, the U.S. Central Command’s press briefings played 
a key role in conveying messages to Saddam Hussein and his high echelon, 
while PSYOP operations led more than 80,000 soldiers to surrender without 
shooting at U.S. forces.16 When employed during peacetime, Perception 
Management does not have to employ deceitful information. Its purpose is to 
influence the opinions of a country’s high ranking officials through a long-term 
and complex manipulative process. The goal is often to improve an image or to 
deter a conflict.17 Perception Management is focused on influencing the highest 
levels of an adversary’s government and/or the general public. This 
encompasses much more than trying to deceive the enemy with camouflage or 
false signals intelligence during a military deception operation. Aforesaid in view, 
even greater preparation must be undertaken during a Perception Management 
offensive. O’Neill has summarized the key requirements of PM effort: 
                                            
15 Pascale Combelles Siegel, Perception Management: IO’s Stepchild? Accessed 20 April 
2007. Available http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a727554648~db=all. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Peter Callamari and Derek Reveron, China’s Use of Perception Management. Accessed 
04 May 2007. Available 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a713830380~db=all. 
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Knowledge of the adversary’s capabilities is important, but his 
decision-making process, psychological mindset, culture, history, 
and leadership must be understood in order to be effective.18 
B. PILLARS OF PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT  
Perception Management is, in fact, influence operations designed to 
persuade adversaries into a favored course of action. This may be achieved 
through the threat and/or use of force and/or political and international pressure. 
The use of force aims to convince adversaries, or third parties, to act in 
accordance with self / national interests and goals. For example, while the 
nuclear weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki destroyed much 
Japanese infrastructure, the U.S. motive was to induce the Japanese to 
surrender – which they achieved. From the tactical to overall strategic 
environments, PM lies at the core of military activities. However, not their 
command processes. In this environment, legitimacy and credibility are the key 
pillars.19  
1. Legitimacy  
If the target audience, both domestic and international in particular, is not 
convinced that the operation is fully justified, their support will slowly wear away, 
perhaps to the point of undermining the sustainability of commitment. In twenty-
first century warfare, legitimacy is perhaps the king pin. Within domestic and non-
adversary audiences, true legitimacy is the perception of an appropriate legal, 
moral, and ethical basis combined often with a belief in the necessity of 
responding militarily. Siegel emphasizes that legitimacy stems from the mandate, 
the respect for the law of war, and regard for humanitarian principles. Legitimacy 
is a key pillar because it sustains popular support and will to fight, without which 
democracies cannot sustain military action. It must, also, be born in mind that in 
certain scenarios, as was the case in the Kargil Conflict, successful Perception 
                                            
18 Richard O’Neill, ‘‘Toward a Methodology for Perception Management,’’ Defense Technical 
Information Center (Newport, RI: The United States Naval War College, June 1989), p. 15.  
19 Pascale Combelles Siegel, Perception Management: IO’s Stepchild? Accessed 20 April 
2007. Available http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a727554648~db=all. 
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Management effort (as done by the Indians), with almost no counter-effort, can 
lead to forming legitimacy with both domestic and international audiences.  
2. Credibility 
While legitimacy is a critical foundation to maintaining an operation and 
mustering support for it, credibility, within both friendly and hostile audiences, is 
the second important pillar of PM. Adversaries must believe that the country has 
both the capability and will to act (i.e., they can match their words with actions.) 
For this reason, their perceptions must be managed.  
C. VULNERABILITY FACTORS 
Having discussed the definition of PM, its importance and the key pillars, 
the matter that merits discussion here is why, in today’s information world, where 
the world has transformed into a global village, are the societies more vulnerable 
to manipulation. This emphasizes the need for PM to yet another level. Siegel 
argues that this vulnerability is owing to the following factors.20 
1. Worldwide Media Reach 
Media operate on a worldwide basis and information is exchanged in real-
time. The media reach has changed and it is now more pervasive and fast. 
Broadcasts are no longer confined to traditionally local audiences and media 
channels equally aim at the international audiences. Satellite, cable, and Internet 
provide worldwide broadcast reach for any media outlet. The worldwide media 
reach ensures that events taking place virtually anywhere can get propagated 
instantaneously and have global impact. 
2. Incessant News Cycle and 24/7 News Reporting 
With the immense advancements in technology, the news cycle has been 
redefined. Between cable and the Internet, and all-news television and radio 
stations, the news is constantly being aired and there is tremendous information-
                                            
20 Pascale Combelles Siegel, Perception Management: IO’s Stepchild? Accessed 20 April 
2007. Available http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a727554648~db=all. 
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space to be filled. In the search for breaking news and competitive business 
advantage, the preference is towards taking the lead at airing the news first. 
Thus, standards for verifying facts all too often fall to the wayside. With little 
breaking news to report, media outlets turn to experts to fill in open time. The 
real-time reporting and commentaries are accorded more importance.  
3. Real-time Information 
With the big boom of media outlets all over the world, especially privately 
owned news channels and their around-the clock operations, along with the 
availability of Internet, the news cycle has become a constant stream of 
information. The twenty-first century news business is real-time. The pressures of 
competition and the need to fill an ever-expanding information space means that 
increasingly “being first matters more than being right.” Most of the time, the 
priority is getting the news out rather than verification, and, sometimes, the 
evident biases are ignored. This was demonstrated during the Kargil Conflict 
where the Western media based their reporting on what was being reported by 
the Indian media. In that context, rumors, half-truths, and unchecked information 
quickly become news. This, also, places intense pressure on officials to react to 
stories before they know all the facts.  
4. Inexpensive and Easy News Creation / Acquisition of Images 
The creation of news reporting / acquisition of images is, these days, a 
very cheap and trouble-free task. Under the right set of circumstances, aired at 
the right time, a low-quality, raw, but newsworthy video can have a surprising 
effect and bring about strong public reaction influencing the leaders to make 
critical decisions. The October 1993 video of an angry Somali crowd dragging the 
body of an American serviceman in the streets of Mogadishu, perhaps more than 
the battle itself and the U.S. casualties, put Somalia on top of the political agenda 
in Washington. Similarly, the posting of pictures from Abu-Ghraib prison on the 
Internet gave the U.S. higher-echelon sleepless nights. The U.S. had to do lot of 
damage control. These days, all it takes is the posting of a raw video from a cell 
22 
phone, or an audio message or statement on a host web site to make claims for 
some terrorist attack anywhere in the world, and the message gets picked up by 
the electronic media and is propagated globally within hours, if not minutes.  
5. The Internet 
The Internet as a carrier compounds these effects. It has created a space 
where information can be easily disseminated and acted on. On the Internet, 
information takes a life of its own. The information being uploaded needs not to 
be true, and false information lingers and lives on. 
In today’s environment, these developments create tremendous 
challenges for Perception Management efforts. Adversaries have near 
instantaneous access to audiences at an incredible low cost. The structure of the 
media environment and democratic institutions can make it easier for adversaries 
to access and influence worldwide reporting. For developing countries, these 
vulnerabilities mentioned above, especially the media tool, can be highly useful 
and, with not much associated cost, to mount a successful perception 
management effort.  
D. PRINCIPLES / TENETS OF PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 
Callamari and Reveron have noted that, when designing a Perception 
Management effort, certain deception principles, or tenets, apply.21  These are 
enumerated in the ensuing paragraphs: 
1. Manipulating Preexisting Belief  
According to the first principle, manipulating an opponent’s preexisting 
belief is easier than presenting false evidence in attempting to change it. 
Applying this to Perception Management, the cognitive biases which play a vital 
role in what a person notices and how he interprets it, seem to be highly 
dependent on what the person expects to find. Concerning international  
                                            
21 Peter Callamari and Derek Reveron, China’s Use of Perception Management. Accessed 4 
May 2007. Available http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a713830380~db=all. 
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relationships, the beliefs or existing opinions of the international community are 
often highly difficult to sway. Thus, designing the effort around this principle 
would be more advantageous. 
2.  Conditioning 
The second principle relates to the concept of conditioning (i.e., 
manipulating an opponent’s perception by presenting information bit-by-bit and 
this is far more effective than doing so all at once). An adversary, or the target 
audience, is highly likely to dismiss blunt offerings, especially when they are 
inconsistent with its existing beliefs and already formed opinions. On the other 
hand, gradual but small changes, even if ambiguous in nature, are more likely to 
be accepted by an opponent in ultimately altering / managing its perception over 
time. 
3.  Utilization of Truth 
The third principle of Perception Management entails the utilization of as 
much truthful / legitimate information as possible. By reducing the potential 
conflict with factual information, the originator is more likely to influence the 
opponent. In the end, bits and pieces of truthful information do not necessarily 
equate a factual representation of the big picture. As a result, the originator has 
not directly affected the adversary’s / third party’s cognitive process, but has led 
him to a desired and possibly erroneous conclusion. 
4. Feedback 
The fourth PM principle reinforces the need for feedback mechanism with 
any Perception Management effort. These returned responses of information are 
essential in determining the effectiveness of the effort. They are, also, mandatory 
for making adjustments as and when required in order to achieve the desired 
overall objective. This principle is critical for Perception Management efforts 
because such campaigns last longer and are more likely to require course 
corrections. 
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5. Second Order Effects 
The fifth principle emphasizes that Perception Management planners need 
to closely monitor the results of their efforts. One needs to be cognizant of any 
subtle and unwanted second order effects. While all possible ramifications of a 
Perception Management effort cannot possibly be anticipated, handling 
unwanted developments as soon as they present themselves is critical and 
proves most advantageous. The planners must extinguish detrimental second 
order effects before they develop into more significant problems (i.e., nip-the-evil-
in-the-bud). 
6. Overall Design 
The final principle involves the PM effort’s overall design. Prior to 
beginning a Perception Management offensive, the placement and presentation 
of material needs to be mapped out. With Perception Management, the timing 
and flow of intended information to the opponent is critical. A sudden ‘‘lucky 
break’’ concerning available information will always be viewed skeptically by an 
opponent, and, thus should not be presented in such a manner. 
E. PM OBJECTIVES 
PM must bring together various command specialties. This includes public 
affairs, intelligence, psychological operations, civil military operations, defense 
support to public diplomacy, and some Department of State / Foreign Office 
specialties, such as public diplomacy, international public information, and 
international broadcast systems. Siegel asserts that PM seeks the following three 
major objectives to:22  
• Build and preserve public opinion support (at home and abroad) to 
gain and maintain legitimacy; 
• Communicate desired intent and objectives to hostile and/or third 
parties to establish a high degree of credibility so they fully 
understand the consequences of their actions; 
                                            
22 Pascale Combelles Siegel, Perception Management: IO’s Stepchild? Accessed 20 April 
2007. Available http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a727554648~db=all. 
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• Influence the attitudes and behaviors of the local populations so 
they act in accordance with one’s own objectives. 
PM must target several audiences. Domestic audiences require 
information about an operation’s legitimacy, risks and benefits, notwithstanding 
the fact that, without public support, democracies cannot sustain military 
engagement. Meanwhile, adversaries’ and third-party perceptions must be 
managed so that they re-order their priorities and strategies in accordance with 
the originator’s goals and objectives. Achieving both goals, in outright war 
fighting (or operations other than war), is fostered by active Perception 
Management efforts.  
F. PM TOOLS  
The ability to create situation awareness is a key factor of control and 
success in warfare. This has been aptly demonstrated during recent modern 
conflicts. One could describe modern war as the battle of trust, and, in a battle of 
trust, the endeavor is to control the truth. The traditional concepts of Information 
Operations assume that there is one truth and that IO is about manipulating the 
ability to see the true picture of the situation. Perception warfare is not about 
damaging the truth; rather, it is about creating the truth. In both perspectives, 
truth is the victim.23 
The Perception Management process, also referred to as Influence 
Operations, may well be yet another pseudonym for propaganda. Taylor while 
laying out PM Tools, asserts that:24 
[Perception Management] ... needs to embrace a number of 
established communication practices, including public diplomacy 
(and private diplomacy), media relations (known as Public 
Information in Europe, and as Public Affairs in the U.S.), PSYOP 
and even the exercise of Soft Power such as cultural and 
educational relations. These are the areas in which the ability to 
convince others of “truth”, whether by short-term activity such as 
                                            
23 Henrik Friman, Perception Warfare: a perspective for the future. Accessed 29 May 2007. 
Available http://www.militaryscience.org/public/media/publications/Friman(1999)PW.PDF. 
24 P. M. Taylor, Perception Management and the ‘War’ Against Terrorism. Accessed 10 June 
2007. Available http://www.terrorismresearch.net/docs/taylor.pdf. 
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radio broadcasting, Internet, print media or press conferences, or 
by longer-term work in the areas of educational and cultural activity, 
depends critically upon the credibility of the information source. 
That credibility, as we have seen through our historical examples, 
very much depends upon the willingness of the target audience 
(whether it be individuals, specific groups of entire populations) to 
believe what they are being told. 
The growing use of media (electronic and print) as a primary tool for PM 
efforts, especially in the context of Pakistan-India scenario, as was demonstrated 
during the 1999 Kargil conflict, will be discussed in Chapter V. 
G. PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
There is no denying the fact that perceptions can be managed. In fact, 
some societies are more susceptible than others to manipulation via the 
Perception Management offensive. The beauty of a Perception Management 
effort is that it is a soft tool. According to O’Neill,25 
[Perception Management] … need not cost large sums of scarce 
fiscal resources to be effective. And, even if it is unsuccessful, it is 
likely to go undetected, leaving a clean image in international 
relations. 
Contrary to strategic military deception; Perception Management is more 
systematic, leading an adversary to more slowly implement changes favorable to 
the originator. This effort can include the manipulation of an opponent’s 
perception through an attempt at influencing its decision making. This is 
accomplished by either showing a false situation or creating a goal that would 
support the originator’s objective. 
Callamari and Reveron, while outlining the PM Process,26 argue that when 
designing a Perception Management offensive, the first step is to establish a 
strategic goal. After establishing an objective(s), the user must research and 
know the opponent. The originator must have a clear and accurate 
                                            
25 Richard O’Neill, ‘‘Toward a Methodology for Perception Management,’’ Defense Technical 
Information Center (Newport, RI: The United States Naval War College, June 1989), p. 32. 
26 Peter Callamari and Derek Reveron, China’s Use of Perception Management. Accessed 4 
May 2007. Available http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a713830380~db=all. 
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understanding of an adversary’s decision making process, as well as its culture, 
beliefs, and history. It is important that Perception Management planners must be 
cautious enough not to treat all targets the same. Various cultures react 
differently in different situations. In addition, in order to have a successful 
Perception Management effort, the originator must be cognizant of the target’s 
frame of reference. Senior officials are often slow to change their opinion, and 
often place more stock in their own personal observations because they have 
well-developed sets of beliefs. 
The next step is to design the Perception Management effort and decide 
how best to influence the adversary. During this stage the possibility for the PM 
effort to be discovered needs to be measured. This step should be taken while 
always remembering that such actions need to be grounded in fact. After 
designing, and then implementing the campaign, feedback mechanisms need to 
be established in order to make an assessment on the effectiveness of the effort. 
Such feedback will allow the originator to make adjustments accordingly, pull 
back if necessary, and to protect from counter-Perception Management efforts by 
the opponent.  
Callamari and Reveron argue that, at a minimum, Perception 
Management includes four steps:27  
(1)  Getting the target’s attention;  
(2)  Presenting relevant information to hold the target’s attention;  
(3)  Portraying the information in a way consistent with the target’s 
memory or experiences; and  
(4)  Repeatedly communicating the information to remain congruent 
and to avoid the ploy from being discovered by the target.  
In addition to the above, it is paramount that the information should be 
timely. 
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IV. MEDIA AND PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 
Attaining 100 victories in 100 battles is not the pinnacle of 
excellence. Subjugating an enemy’s army without fighting is the 
true pinnacle of excellence. 
Sun Tzu 
As noted, the modern era is an age of communication revolution; after the 
Second World War, which divided the world into two ideological blocks, 
propaganda techniques acquired a great importance. Today, all nations are busy 
day and night in projecting their point of view, and in trying to convince others 
about their merits. In this world of conflicting ideas, nations are busy waging a 
constant war of words. The revolution in information technology, 
communications, as well as the revolutionary changes in the employment of air 
power, have not only profoundly influenced analysts and planners, but have, 
also, completely changed the conduct of war. 
The two Gulf Wars afforded the world its first glimpse of the future of 
warfare. Millions around the globe were treated to images of precision-guided 
bombs annihilating targets in downtown Baghdad. They, also, learned of satellite 
uplinks from the battle field that provided real-time connectivity, and were awed 
by the ability of stealth aircraft to ensure aerial dominance. As Hali noted, 
everyone seemed to understand that something was different about this “Video 
Game War.” There was much more to this spectacle than the ones provided by 
previous wars.  
When it comes to India and Pakistan, the former has grown great bounds 
in acquiring this power and has been putting it to good use for her benefits. With 
a number of satellite television channels and remarkable advancement in IT, 





making very effective use of any media to which they have access. India’s use of 
the media to mislead its own people, both during the Kargil crisis28 in 1999 and, 
thereafter, in the 2002 Indo-Pak stand-off, are key examples. 
The important thing to note is that the revolutions in the field of information 
technology have caused the media to have a much greater impact on operations. 
Thus, it is imperative to understand the role of media in future conflicts. This 
chapter reflects upon media resources of India, its media strengths, and its 
designs. It is pertinent to make a mention of what are media, how it relates to 
information war, its objectives and the desired effects. 
A. WHAT ARE MEDIA? 
Media are the medium by virtue of which the thoughts, feelings, ideas, 
concepts, and information are conveyed to the masses. Media play a vital role in 
society as it disseminates information, molds, and shapes public opinion. The 
reason is simply because this is the age of communication explosion and 
information revolution. The media are a key element in the implementation of a 
Perception Management effort. 
Media are pre-eminently a democratic instrument, fashioned to dominate 
the mass minds and general will of complete nations or societies. In this thesis, 
the term media refers to two types of media:  
• Electronic Media. It includes television, satellite, computer / 
Internet, film, and radio. 
• Print Media. It includes newspapers, magazines, and books. 
Media have three societal roles: 
• As a watchman, to provide information about happenings and 
events. 
• As the contributor to the decision making process, to provide the 
material necessary for a dialogue on certain issues. 
                                            
28 Sultan M. Hali, “The Role of Media in War,” PR Society of Indonesia. Accessed 20 June 
2007. Available http://www.pr-society.or.id/artikel4.asp. 
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• As a modifier of attitude during the process of decision making, the 
media should modify attitude preferences and actions in the desired 
direction.  
The media gathers information from various sources which are broadly 
categorized as Overt and Covert. These are enumerated below: 
• Overt Sources:  
• Press briefings  
• Press releases/handouts  
• Staged observation (e.g., supervised visit/tour of battle area) 
• Covert Sources:  
• Surreptitious human contact  
• Electronic eaves dropping  
• Sub-rosa observation (e.g., clandestine visits to battle areas) 
B. THE MEDIA AND INFORMATION WAR 
It is now widely discussed that information forms the fifth dimension of war 
along with land, space, sea and air; though Information Operations have many 
dimensions. Since information is now a valuable resource, its dissemination 
through the media has important bearing on national and international security.  
The media are no longer a simple observer of war; rather, it is an actual 
participant within it and, thus, is a “legitimate target.” Whereas, in the deceptively 
named World War II strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany, the 
primary targets were weapon factories and shipyards. Today, the largely 
accurately labeled precision-guided weaponry is directed at power stations, 
television and radio transmitters, and telephone exchanges. In fact, since the two 
Gulf Wars, the relationship between the media and security, or how the media 
can be used in waging information war, has become an exciting area of research. 
The Gulf Wars showed how information could be used both as a military target 
and as a weapon. In the recent Gulf War, the allies bombed Al-Jazeera TV 
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station in Baghdad and, in the Kosovo conflict of 1999, NATO bombed the 
Belgrade TV station, justifying it as a military target.29  
Military-media relations are entering into a new era. Media and 
communication technologies are increasingly used by different governments to 
attain their foreign policy objectives. Moreover, the all-pervasive nature of 
communication technologies has not allowed governments to impose tight control 
on information flow as previously. This has resulted in the use of these 
technologies by a variety of different and unofficial ethno-religious or dissatisfied 
groups in a society to achieve their divergent objectives.30  
C. MEDIA OBJECTIVES 
When using media for Perception Management, the intent is to achieve 
the following objectives: 
• Stimulates the Mass Mentality on the Home Front. It is 
accomplished by awakening tribal instinct latent in man. These 
instincts are focused in order to transform the enemy into an evil 
entity. Allied propaganda against Hitler and, more recently against 
Saddam Hussein, are examples. The potential audiences are 
primarily one’s own public. 
• Wins the Support of Neutral Nations. In this dimension, through 
carefully managed control, media aims to win the support of 
neutrals. In both World Wars, the British did this successfully. 
Similarly, in the recent past, during the 1999 Kargil Conflict, the 
Indian media created so much hype aimed at the West using its 
media propaganda, that they were able to win substantial political 
support. Eventually the Pakistani forces, though tactically at an 
advantage by taking forward defensive positions, had to withdraw in 
the face of immense international pressure. This was helped partly 
by the absence of Perception Management efforts by Pakistan. 
• Targets the Mass Mind on the Inner Front of a Hostile Nation. 
This aims at defeating the adversary psychologically by subverting 
their public and defense forces and, also, disarming them morally.  
                                            
29 Jim Naureckas, Legitimate Targets? How U.S. Media Supported War Crimes in 
Yugoslavia. Accessed 22 May 2007. Available http://www.fair.org/extra/9907/kosovo-crimes.html. 
30 Md Shamsul Islam, “Media’s Role in South Asian Security: A Case Study,” Regional 
Studies, Autumn 2001. 
33 
D. TARGET AUDIENCE AND DESIRED EFFECTS 
Broadly speaking, in terms of the Indo-Pak context, there are basically two 
target audience groups: 
• Literate People.  Here the support of elite, literate personalities is 
achieved by appealing to some political, moral, or economic 
perspective; which, in turn, creates the momentum to win general 
public support. This class is composed of the following categories 
of professionals: 
• Educators and writers. 
• Artists and people related to mass media. 
• Policy-makers. 
• Bureaucracy. 
• Religious / ethnic leaders. 
• Masses.  Here the support of the masses is won by exploiting: 
• Religious feelings. 
• Ethnic groups. 
• Occupational groups. 
Some effects that can be achieved through effective and successful 
employment of media resources are enumerated below:  
• Erodes and undermines the moral resolution and the enemy’s 
ultimate belief in victory. 
• Creates mental confusion, contradictory feeling, indecisiveness, 
panic, fear, and discontentment. 
• Undermines the patriotism and sentiments of the people. 
• Targets the basic ideology. 
• Reduces trust in leadership. 
• Encourages partisan feelings. 
• Encourages social and political revolutions. 
• Wins support of neutral nations. 
E. MEDIA RESOURCES OF INDIA 
The media has grown considerably in the last few decades to include print 
media, TV channels, radio, Internet, and others. While India and Pakistan both 
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have a diverse mix of different kinds of media, there is a predominance of print 
media in terms of size and numbers. In India alone, as of 31 March 2006, there 
were 62,483 registered newspapers.31 Out of these, the number of dailies being 
published in the country was 2130. The majority of Indian newspapers were 
periodicals. In addition, the available data shows 3428 were weeklies, 955 
fortnightlies, 1471 monthlies, 219 quarterlies, 49 annuals, and 221 other 
periodicities.  
F. INDIAN MEDIA STRENGTHS 
Indian media, particularly electronic media, enjoys relative credibility and 
popularity all over the world. Some of the strengths of Indian media are: 
• A well developed media infrastructure. 
• Global reach through satellite channels.  
• Cutting-edge Information Technology. 
• Popularity at international level, mainly due to the attractions of a 
colorful cultural heritage, and a glamorous film industry.  
• Credibility built up over a long span of time.  
G. INDIAN DESIGNS 
Having mentioned the strengths of Indian media, it is pertinent to mention 
the long term designs of Indian media - at least as can be discerned through 
observation: 
• Endeavors to predispose the masses of target countries favorably 
towards India. Desired messages are conveyed innocently under 
the garb of entertainment and utility programs. 
• Strives to establish a balanced and accepted credibility in news and 
views by using extensive satellite transmissions.  
• Desires to ultimately provide the satellite media as a regional 
network catering to the needs of all those who reside in South Asia. 
• As a state policy, aims to project Pakistan as a state abetting 
terrorism and to isolate Pakistan both regionally and internationally. 
                                            
31 Registrar of Newspapers for India. Accessed 10 June 2007. Available 
https://rni.nic.in/pii.htm.  
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• Desires to keep Pakistan socially demoralized, and militarily 
ineffective. 
• Strives to project India as the guardian of regional peace and 
security in order to gain support for the United Nations Security 
Council’s permanent seat. 
Having highlighted the role of media as “the tool” of Perception 
Management, especially in the South Asian context, it is pertinent to review the 
vast effects that can be achieved using this vital tool for Perception Management. 
The next chapter discusses the Kargil conflict as a case in point where Indians 
successfully used media not only to cover up their tactical failures, but, also, to 
convert the Kargil episode into a political victory at both the domestic and 
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V. THE 1999 KARGIL CONFLICT 
[Disinformation] ... that even now continues to metastasize within 
academe and the media to such a degree that myth threatens to 
overthrow history. 
Gore Vidal 
Successful Indian Perception Management efforts and little or nothing 
done by Pakistan to counter such efforts allowed Kargil to become “the first 
(Indian) publicised limited military exchange between Pakistan and India after the 
nuclearization of South Asia.”32 As only the Indian “one-sided reporting” of Kargil 
was publicized, the real history of Kargil became obscured. It is a central aim of 
this thesis to present the Pakistani case, to set the record, if not exactly straight, 
then to provide a balancing viewpoint through Pakistani eyes.  
A. KARGIL CONFLICT - A PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE 
The Kargil Conflict of 1999 was primarily a limited, tactical, defensive 
operation for Pakistan, linked to a series of events and military exchanges 
between Pakistan and India along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir since the 
signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972. As a backup to understanding the Kargil 
conflict, General Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Kargil Conflict, 
in his memoir, stressed that:  
Kargil was not a one-off operation, but the latest in a series of 
moves and countermoves at a tactical level by India and Pakistan 
along the Line of Control in the inaccessible, snowbound northern 
areas. India would capture a location where they felt that our 
[Pakistani] presence was thin, and vice-versa. This is how they 
[Indian Army] managed to occupy Siachen (ostensibly without 
clearance from the Indian government). This is how the Kashmiri 
freedom fighting Mujahideen occupied the Kargil heights that the 
Indian army had vacated for the winter.33 
                                            
32 Shireen M. Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: 
Ferozsons, 2004). p. 15. 
33 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire – A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 87. 
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Pakistan feels deeply wronged by an India that exploited an internal crisis 
in Eastern Pakistan, captured the Siachen glacier (Operation Meghdoot) despite 
the 1972 Simla agreement, planned a pre-emptive attack on Pakistan’s nuclear 
facilities in the garb of the 1987 Brasstacks exercise, and suppressed the 
Kashmiri people for decades.34 Pakistanis always have had great difficulty in 
comprehending why the international community allowed India to get away with 
these perceived injustices.  
Pakistan’s sense of historical grievances, fueled especially by the 1971 
Bangladesh war, India’s 1984 occupation of the Siachen glacier, and a series of 
subsequent incursions and skirmishes along the northern LoC, raised the 
concerns and fears of yet another Indian aggression in 1999 in the northern 
areas. Therefore, Pakistani forces took a “forward defense posture across the 
LoC” at a time when Kashmiri Mujahideen had occupied vacated Indian winter 
positions to settle scores with Indians and draw them away from the Indian 
Occupied Kashmir.  
B. A HISTORY OF INJUSTICES  
Pakistanis believe that the status quo in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir 
is illegitimate. The outcome of the partition of British India in 1947 was neither fair 
nor just. The border drawn by the Radcliffe commission was controversial, the 
division of civil and military assets inequitable, and, most importantly, the 
accession of princely states35 were deemed improper. The most glaring injustice 
                                            
34 For a comprehensive elaboration of these views, see Javed Hassan, India: A Study in 
Profile (Rawalpindi: Army Education Press, GHQ, 1990). See, also, Stephen Philip Cohen, The 
Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 102-110. 
35 The British ruled India with two administrative systems. One was ‘Provinces’ and the other 
‘Princely States’. About 60% of the Indian sub-continent's territories were Provinces and 40% 
were Princely States. Provinces were British territories completely under British control. Princely 
States were states in British India with a local ruler or king with an honorary title, such as 
Maharaja, Raja, Maharani, Rana, Nizam, Badshah, and other such titles (meaning king or ruler in 
different Indian languages). These rulers were subjected to the British Empire. These two types of 
administrative systems were the result of the British East India Company's attempt to annex the 
whole of Indian sub-continent and make it into a British territory. When the British gave the Indian 
sub-continent independence in 1947, there were 562 Princely States. Some of them, such as 
Kashmir, Mysore, and Hyderabad, were as large as England. There were, also, smaller Princely 
states, such as Junagad, Udaipur, Janjira, Aundh, and Cochin. Accessed 15 June 2007. 
Available http://adaniel.tripod.com/princely.htm.  
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was created by the incorporation into India of the state of Jammu and Kashmir—
a Muslim majority state under a Hindu ruler, or maharaja.36 The Hindu leaders 
have long oppressed the Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir and the 
questionable, forced accession into the Indian Union has denied the populace of 
their right to self-determination. Pakistanis emphasize the UN Security Council’s 
demand for a “free and impartial plebiscite.”37  
India’s heavy-handed policies over the Kashmiri populace are taken as 
proof that only through extensive oppression can the Indian state suppress the 
desire for Kashmiri self-determination. Indian abuses are highlighted in the 
Pakistani press. Pakistanis, on the streets and in uniform, look across the Line of 
Control and see a long history of vote rigging, arbitrary arrest, torture, and rape 
by an occupying Indian force. Many accounts of atrocities by the Indian Security 
forces in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir have, also, been recorded by the 
Human Rights Watch, U.S. Department of State, and Amnesty International.38 
India supported the insurgency in East Pakistan and, subsequently, 
intervened militarily into East Pakistan. The garrison was defeated and Pakistan 
lost its eastern wing in 1971.39 The 1971 war created an indelible imprint on the 
security thinking in Pakistan. While the war had no direct linkage to Kashmir, 
Pakistanis believe that India’s role in Bangladesh stands as irrefutable proof that 
India will intervene whenever Pakistan presents any vulnerability—a lesson 
reinforced by India’s occupation of Siachen thirteen years later.  
                                            
36 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004), pp. 46-7. 
37 Official Records of the UN Security Council, Third Year, 286th Meeting, 21 April 1948 
(document S/726). Accessed 25 June 2007. Available http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/repertoire/46-
51_08.pdf. 
38 See Human Rights Watch Report, Behind the Kashmir Conflict. Accessed 5 July 2007. 
Available http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/. Also, see Bibliography/Reference Links for 
reports and documents on human rights in India, Accessed 5 July 2007. Available 
http://homepages.uc.edu/thro/dilemma/biblio.html. 
39 For background on the Pakistani political crisis and the India-Pakistan war, see Richard 
Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
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Pakistan and India signed a peace accord at Simla in 1972, normally 
referred to as Simla Agreement. India emphasizes that Simla commits both 
countries “to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral 
negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between 
them.”40 Pakistan stresses the non-use of force to resolve conflicts—which India 
violated in its 1984 occupation of the Siachen glacier—and notes that the 
agreement explicitly states that it conforms with the “principles and purposes” of 




Figure 4.   Map of Indian Ingress at the Siachen Glacier as appeared in 
Shireen Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Fact from 
Fiction (From: Islamabad: Ferozsons, 2004), p. 12. 
 
                                            
40 Simla Agreement, 2 July 1972, article 1(ii), Accessed 22 June 207. Available 
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/shimla.htm. 
41 Article 1 (vi) and article 1 (i), respectively. 
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In 1989, Kashmiri political activists and Mujahideen (freedom fighters) 
staged a mostly indigenous uprising against Indian authorities in response to 
Indian atrocities. The freedom movement in Kashmir ties down more than 
400,000 Indian troops in so called counterinsurgency operations.42 Even if a 
Pakistani government were to shut off all political and moral support to Kashmiri 
Mujahideen, there is great concern that India would “pocket the concession” and 
maintain a hard-line against Pakistan. This perception—partially based on 
strategic logic and partially based in fear and mistrust—further complicates the 
ability of Pakistan’s leadership to extricate itself from the present Kashmir policy. 
All of this provides a larger context to the calculations behind the Kargil 
operation. This operation, fueled by intelligence reports, can be seen as a logical 
continuation of Pakistani fears of another Siachen-like Indian operation.  
C. THE KASHMIRI MUJAHIDEEN FACTOR AND UNFOLDING OF 
EVENTS 
By 1998, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with its militarist, Hindutva43 
creed, was in power. The Indians introduced an increasing number of forces to 
intensify the suppression of the Kashmiri struggle in Indian-occupied Kashmir. 
The Kashmiri Mujahideen were hard-pressed in the urban areas of the province. 
Therefore, in order to regroup and refocus their military struggle and give it a 
necessary military boost, they dispersed into the mountainous terrain along the 
                                            
42 Mahendra Ved and Rajat Pandit, “Valley Forces Wait and Watch,” Times of India, 12 
November 2004. 
43 Hindutva is one of the two main pillars of the BJP's (Bharatiya Janata Party) philosophy. 
Hindutva, or Cultural Nationalism, presents the BJP's conception of Indian nationhood. In the 
1998 BJP election manifesto, referred to as the BJP's National Agenda for Governance, the 
Party's Hindutva creed was apparent not only in the national security agenda but, also, in the 
economic policy guidelines. In the case of the latter, the National Agenda for Governance stated: 
"We will continue with the reform process, give it a strong Swadeshi thrust to ensure that the 
national economy grows on the principle that India shall be built by Indians." On the issue of 
National Security, the Agenda declared: "The state of preparedness, morale and combat 
effectiveness of the Armed Forces shall receive early attention and appropriate remedial action. 
We will establish a National Security Council to analyze the military, economic and political 
threats to the nation, also, to continuously advise the government. This council will undertake 
India's first ever Strategic Defense Review. To ensure the security, territorial integrity and unity of 
India we will take all necessary steps and exercise all available options. Towards that end we will 
re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons." Accessed 24 
June 2007. Available www.bjp.org/philo.htm. 
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LoC. The intent, also, seemed aimed at diverting the Indian security forces away 
from the area of the Mujahideen's main focus, the Indian occupied Kashmir 
Valley. In addition, the targeting of the civilian population by the Indian forces 
across the Line of Control was pushing the Mujahideen into taking more direct 
action against the Indian Army around the Kargil area. 
For these Mujahideen, the terrain in the north was highly suited for their 
operations. There were many stretches of inhospitable, unoccupied territory in 
the Dras-Kargil sector, making detection difficult, and through which across-the-
LoC movement of the people of the two sides - the Valley as well as the Northern 
Areas - used to take place without fear of detection. The Mujahideen were helped 
by many local volunteers in order to interdict the Indian army in response to the 
heavy Indian firing across the LoC.  
It is to be born in mind that thousands of Mujahideen, mostly indigenous to 
Indian-held Kashmir, but, also, supported by freelance sympathizers from 
Pakistan, did operate against the Indian forces. They used to cross the Line of 
Control in both directions at places which were thinly-held and where the going 
was rough. 
Indian troops predictably vacated posts along the LoC as they retreated to 
winter positions—a normal measure taken by both Indian and Pakistani forces to 
reduce the strains on forces during the harsh winter months.44 Thus, this 
opportunity was seized by the Mujahideen to settle scores with the Indians and 
draw them away from Indian-occupied Kashmir. 
                                            
44 At remote posts in higher altitudes, both Indian and Pakistani forces would retreat to lower 
heights during the winter to reduce the intense logistical and weather hazards incumbent in 
deploying troops during such conditions. After the establishment of the Ceasefire Line (and, 
subsequently, the Line of Control), both India and Pakistan tacitly allowed such winter retreats to 
occur without attempts to take advantage of them, a norm consistent with the letter and spirit of 
the Karachi Agreement of 1949. Following the seizure of Siachen glacier by Indian troops in 
1984, both sides dramatically reduced the number of forward posts they would vacate during the 
harsh winter months. For a study of the harsh terrain for military operations in northern areas see, 





Figure 5.   Map of the Kargil Conflict Area as appeared in Shireen Mazari, 
The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (From: 
Islamabad: Ferozsons, 2004), p. 46. 
The Mujahideen plan’s boldness, also made it dangerous and, ultimately, 
untenable. Its success would require Mujahideens to infiltrate across the LoC and 
to maintain their positions for weeks without being detected. After their inevitable 
discovery, they would have to hold off Indian counterattacks until the onset of 
winter. This would close the passes, halt military operations, and allow 
Mujahideen to harden their positions, and shift the Indian operations away from 
the Valley.  
Once the Mujahideen executed their plan, the number and frequency of 
reported attacks by Mujahideen on Indian forces became unprecedented. This 
could have possibly been used by the Indians as a preamble to launch an 
operation against Pakistan. Pakistani military planners had grown increasingly 
concerned about India’s military build-up in occupied Kashmir and the 
Mujahideen attacks in Indian forces. The past experience of Indian incursions, 
44 
combined with a continuous, gradual increase in Indian forces in the region, 
along with the wide gaps between Pakistani defensive positions, caused concern 
for all responsible in the military chain of command.  
In the winter of 1998, when India’s 70th and 114th Brigade did not return to 
their original positions in the Kashmir Valley, Pakistani planners became 
particularly troubled. In their minds, their failure to move toward a “forward 
defense posture across the LoC” would leave Pakistani positions dangerously 
vulnerable. Pakistani intelligence reports indicated an increase in Indian forces in 
the area.45 The intelligence indicated that India was once again planning a 
military move along the LoC in order to tilt the balance in the Kashmir conflict and 
to move towards a settlement through tactical military gains. Thus, instead of 
retreating to their normal winter positions, Pakistani forces moved forward into 
previously unoccupied gaps and positions left vacant by Indian forces during the 
winter months.  
The planners seemed convinced that India would not expand the conflict 
elsewhere along the LoC or the international border. They were, also, convinced 
that the international community would view the Kargil incursion as part of the 
normal pattern of military activity along the LoC, similar to India’s occupation of 
the Siachen glacier fifteen years earlier in 1984. The perceived need for a 
“forward defense posture,” taken in the utmost secrecy, likely compelled the 
Kargil Pakistani planners to use only the forces that they had readily available. If 
they had inducted fresh troops, India would have suspected an offensive 
operation, and Pakistan would have lost surprise. Second line forces under the 
FCNA, called Northern Light Infantry, composed of locals of the area, despite the 
difficult terrain and weather conditions, executed the maneuver and occupied the 
forward positions to deter any Indian countermoves. The troops had special 
instructions not to cross the watershed along the LoC. 
                                            
45 Mazari, also, has argued that Pakistani planners were worried about an Indian operation 
against Pakistani positions in the Shaqma sector. Shireen M. Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999: 
Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: Ferozsons, 2004), pp. 28-32. 
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When these developments were discovered, after the initial confrontation 
and mass Indian casualties, the Indians overreacted by escalating the conflict 
vertically, militarily, and horizontally, in diplomatic terms. The vertical expansion 
involved Indian artillery and air force attacks. Moreover, the actions of the Indian 
Air Force were not confined to the Mujahideen locations. The Indians, also, 
started crossing over and bombarding positions of the Pakistan Army. This 
resulted in the shooting down of one of the Indian helicopters and two jet fighter 
planes over Pakistani territory. The Indians, also, showed no hesitation in 
attacking Pakistani troops on the LoC on the ground and from the air. 
The expansion of the Kargil conflict was partially the result of the initial 
panic on the Indian side when they discovered the strategic heights which the 
Mujahideen had occupied. This panic was rather apparent, not only in the 
amassment of military hardware and troops, but, also in their haste to give 
military awards as a means of reviving the sagging morale of their soldiers. As a 
result, they awarded their highest military wartime gallantry award -- the Param 
Vir Chakra (PVC), posthumously to a soldier, Havildar Yogender Singh Yadav, 
who was alive and undergoing treatment at the base hospital in Delhi.46 The 
event was an embarrassment for the Indians and they later started coming up 
with cover stories to down play this faux pas. 
Pakistani defensive positions held at bay the massive onslaught by 
Indians operationally equipped for high-altitude conditions. Having failed to 
dislodge the groups occupying the heights, the Indians resorted to mass attacks 
with little or no success, managing only to vacate 10-11% of the posts.47 The 
Indian media hyped their success. On the Pakistani side, the political leadership 
made no serious effort to rally the country. 
India’s military, political, and diplomatic responses stood out in sharp 
contrast to a disarrayed Pakistani policymaking. Pakistan’s Foreign Office was 
                                            
46 Rediff on the net. Accessed 2 July 2007. Available 
http://www.rediff.com/republic/2000/jan/27param.htm. 
47 Shireen Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: 
Ferozsons, 2004), p. 63. 
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not prepared to rebut India’s diplomatic maneuvers. The gaps between 
competing bureaucratic and political entities, also significantly complicated the 
handling of the Kargil crisis. As Maleeha Lodhi has noted,  
The Kargil affair has exposed systematic flaws in a decision-making 
process that is impulsive, chaotic, erratic, and overly secretive. The 
elimination of internal checks and balances… yielded a 
personalized system of governance which delivers hasty decisions, 
whose consequences are not thought through, and which are 
predicated on lack of consultation and scrutiny even within the 
establishment, much less based on public consent.48 
D. THE POLITICAL CANVAS 
The mismanagement of the Kargil operation by the Pakistan government 
led to Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation. Unable to defend and project the Kargil 
incursion as a logical outcome of Indian policy of territorial aggression against 
Pakistani-administered part of Siachin, the Nawaz Sharif government let the 
Indian media distort Islamabad's limited involvement in Kargil as a paradigm case 
of military invasion of “Indian” territory by Pakistan. Additionally, by keeping its 
"back-channel" links with New Delhi open and active during the entire Kargil 
episode, the government gave credence to the malicious Indian propaganda that 
Kargil was a “rogue” military operation, which had been carried out to sabotage 
the great “Lahore spirit”, unleashed by Vajpayee’s “peace journey” to Pakistan in 
February 1999.  
The Indian Prime Minister’s bus journey to Lahore in February 1999 was 
part and parcel of the “camouflage to military plans in the making.” It was used as 
diplomatic deception within the wider context of the Perception Management 
campaign by India.  
Buying the Indian line on Kargil, as a result of successful Perception 
Management by India (employing primarily the media and Ministry of External 
Affairs), the international community, led by United States, exerted strong  
 
                                            
48 Maleeha Lodhi, The Kargil Crisis: Anatomy of a Debacle, Newsline (July 1999). 
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diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to vacate the Kargil heights and, also, to commit 
itself to observing the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. Syed Rifaat 
Hussain narrates: 
Frightened by the specter of an internationally supported full-scale 
Indian military retaliation, Nawaz Sharif sued for peace essentially 
on Indian terms. The July 4 joint statement which he signed with 
President Bill Clinton in Washington not only called for “concrete 
steps” aimed at the “restoration of the (LoC)” but also clearly stated 
that India-Pakistan dialogue would get underway after “the sanctity 
of the LoC has been fully restored.” India and the world have taken 
this to mean a unilateral undertaking by Pakistan not to stoke 
further the fires of armed struggle in the Indian-held part of 
Kashmir.49 
E. THE EXTERNAL ACTORS 
The Kargil operation was carried out in a very different international 
environment. The motivations for the primary external actors—the United States 
and China—had changed over the years. Pakistan’s ties with U.S. in particular 
were even weaker in 1999, while, conversely the Americans had sought to 
improve relations with New Delhi.50 
The extent of Islamabad’s international isolation during the Kargil episode 
was dramatically illustrated by the studied indifference with which China dealt with 
the whole issue. During their June 1999 visits to China, Beijing told the Pakistani 
Foreign Minister and Prime Minister that Islamabad should not expect China to 
“take sides” in an armed conflict between India and Pakistan and that escalation of 
their tensions had ill-served the cause of regional peace and security.51 Though 
very clear that China stayed completely out of the Kargil conflict, the Indian Army  
 
 
                                            
49 Syed Rifaat Hussain, War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective, IPRI Journal. Vol. IV, 
No. 1, Winter 2004. 
50 For background, see Feroz Hassan Khan and Christopher Clary, “Dissuasion and 
Regional Allies: The Case of Pakistan,” Strategic Insights, 3, no. 10 (October 2004), 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/khanOct04.asp.  
51 Syed Rifaat Hussain, War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective, IPRI Journal. Vol. IV, 
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Chief at the time of Kargil, V P Malik’s book, “Kargil - From Surprise to Victory” 
contains an entire chapter trying to promote Chinese involvement in the Kargil 
conflict and, thus gain political mileage. 
Even more significantly, the international community, especially the United 
States, became opposed to the idea of such limited conflicts occurring between 
two nuclear-armed neighbors.52 
F. PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OF KARGIL 
Public explanations of the planning for this gambit have been biased, as 
almost all of them came either from Indians, or, in case of other authors, the only 
story available to narrate was the version provided by India. In either case, the 
accounts helped perpetuate the Indian side of the story. Indian commentators 
typically view Kargil as the outgrowth of a revisionist Pakistani state seeking to 
alter the political and territorial status quo.53 An extension of this line of thought 
can be found in the Kargil Review Committee report, which portrays the 
operation as an example of the relentless probing of an aggressive Pakistani 
military, looking for chinks in Indian defenses.54 Other Indian commentators, and 
some liberal Pakistani authors, have asserted that Kargil exemplifies the 
frustration of the Pakistani military leadership as it struggled to reassert primacy 
over a civilian government that was pursuing a peace process that endangered 
the corporate interests of the Pakistani armed forces.55 Shaukat Qadir, a retired 
                                            
52 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 165. See, also Bruce Reidel, American Diplomacy and the 
1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Policy Paper Series, 2002 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, Center for the Advanced Study of India, 2002). 
53 See, for instance, Jasjit Singh, “The Fourth War,” in Kargil 1999: Pakistan’s Fourth War for 
Kashmir, Jasjit Singh, ed. (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), 120-1; Lt. Gen. (ret.) Y. M. 
Bammi, Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered (New Delhi: Gorkha, 2002), pp. 83, 89-90. 
54 See “Pak Modus Operandi and India’s Response in the Past,” in From Surprise to 
Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), pp. 49-52. 
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Pakistan army official, whose accounts of Kargil remain questionable for reasons 
of personal grudges, has argued that Kargil was the product of a unique 
confluence of individuals in the Pakistani chain of command, all of whom had 
something to prove.56 Furthermore, publications and statements by U.S. 
policymakers have tended to emphasize the role of nuclear weapons, 
highlighting how a nuclear deterrent can provide an umbrella under which limited 
conflicts can be fought.57  
All of these accounts tell the Indian version of the story as no Pakistani 
sources were available for quite some time. Given the tradition of secrecy within 
the civil and military bureaucracy of Pakistan, a comprehensive Pakistani 
analysis of the Kargil conflict, based on military and other sources, only made its 
appearance in 2003, four years after the outbreak of the conflict between India 
and Pakistan. Dr Shireen M Mazari’s book - The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating 
Fact from Fiction – is the first Pakistani effort to provide a rationale regarding the 
Kargil operations. The author took up the catalogue of myths woven into 
controversial speculations and, with substantiated facts, examined their 
background to show how “Pakistan got sucked into an ever-widening conflict as a 
result of pre-planned Indian actions … which had incrementally escalated as a 
result of India raising the military, political and diplomatic ante.”58 Mazari has 
presented Kargil as the natural outgrowth of historical grievances and a 
                                            
56 Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict,” RUSI Journal (April 2002): pp. 24-30. 
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Pakistan. 
57 Strobe Talbott compares Kargil to the Cuban missile crisis and quotes President William J. 
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Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2005), pp. 143-166. 
58 Shireen Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: 
Ferozsons, 2004), p. 15. 
50 
continuation of tit-for-tat military practices common since the establishment of the 
Line of Control (LoC). Later, in 2006, a second notable published account, 
President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf’s book, 
“In the Line of Fire – A Memoir”, also contained an entire chapter on the Kargil 
Conflict. Musharraf portrays the Kargil operation as a brilliant tactical manoeuvre; 
yet, it is realized that the operation backfired politically. India used the Kargil 
operation in order to castigate Pakistan for cross border terrorism. 
When India published its official inquiry report, The Kargil Review 
Committee Report in 2000, the Western audience, particularly its media and 
academics, saw this as the factual report on Kargil - especially since Pakistan did 
not publish its official version of what Kargil was all about. The United States, and 
its European allies, also, portrayed Kargil as a dangerous "adventure" on the part 
of Pakistan, given the nuclearization of the region. 
The Kargil Project of the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, showed clearly the magnitude of the negative 
fallout for Pakistan as a result of no official disclosures/data on Kargil. The first 
Kargil conference of the CCC brought out the misperceptions and biases of the 
Kargil conflict. 
The second phase of the CCC's Kargil project, which comprised meetings 
in New Delhi in September 2002, further bolstered the view that, unless Pakistan 
put forward a substantive explanation of Kargil, the record would remain biased 
and incorrect and Pakistan's case would go unheard by default. Indian attempts 
to exploit maximum advantage out of Kargil became truly absurd as, by the time 
of the New Delhi round of the CCC's discussions on Kargil, somehow the Indians 
were endeavoring to link al-Qaeda also to Kargil.59 
So the question that arises in one’s mind is; why did Pakistan not follow 
the Indian example of instituting an inquiry commission and then publish the 
findings? The straight forward answer is provided by Mazari: 
                                            
59 See the CCC’s Conference Report, New Delhi, India, 26-27 September 2002, entitled, 
“Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: Crises of 1999, 2002 and Beyond.” 
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Quite simply, this has never been a part of Pakistan's 
strategic/political culture. Born out of a military culture inherited 
from the British Indian army, with a premium on secrecy, there are 
still no publicly available official assessments of the 1965 and 1971 
Pak-India wars. Even the Hamood Ur Rehman Commission Report 
on the 1971 debacle was made public, in part, decades later. In the 
case of Kargil, the Sharif government's shifting stance and inability 
to take responsibility made it even more difficult to evaluate the 
Kargil conflict properly from a Pakistani perspective. 
G. MEDIA IN KARGIL  
During the Kargil conflict, India demonstrated its agility in handling a 
variety of media (e.g., television, print, radio, Internet) to disseminate and control 
the Indian message, shaping, in the process, both the international and the 
domestic misperception of events. India, through the use of media for Perception 
Management, demonstrated that, especially in the South Asian context, there is a 
dire need to develop media strategy as an instrument of warfare. 
H. THEMES EMPLOYED BY INDIAN MEDIA 
Indians used media brilliantly to salvage some pride from the mauling it 
received on the snowy peaks of Kargil. Kargil became one of the worst military 
nightmares for India. It not only caught them napping and off guard, but, also, 
exposed their extreme vulnerabilities and resulted in very high casualties. At the 
same time, the Indians deserve the credit for their resilience and for their 
successful media and diplomatic campaign. This enabled them to sell their story 
and doomed the Kargil operation, though a tactical Pakistani success, to 
strategic failure.  
According to Hali, the way Indian media responded to the crisis, such as 
mobilizing its resources and organizing its television programs, newspaper 
reports, analyses, discussions, features, the famous “rogue army” posters, 
created a wide array of coverage. This convinced the world that Pakistan was the 
aggressor and India the aggrieved party. Propaganda, and Perception 
Management, were fully exploited to dupe their own countrymen. To enhance  
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their position and sanitize the Indian public from the truth, Pakistan television 
(PTV) was banned from Cable networks in India, and Pakistani newspapers were 
blocked on the Internet.60 
The role of the media in shaping domestic and international opinion and 
covering up Indian blunders regarding Kargil is evident in the headlines of major 
Indian newspapers printed during the time. Numerous Indian newspapers were 
filled with accounts portraying Pakistanis as "propped up intruders" in a 
"qualitatively different" infiltration. Such narratives in effect strengthened the view 
of India as a responsible and restrained nuclear nation victimized by its 
overzealous neighbor. Some example headlines are as follows:61 
• "Evidence of Pak Intruders on Indian Side," The Hindu, 29 May 
1999. 
• "Intrusion Obviously Had Full Backing of Pak Government: India," 
The Hindustan Times, 27 May 1999. 
• "Pakistan Army Officers Among Kargil Infiltrators," The Statesman, 
25 May 1999. 
Indians, also, made very intelligent use of the Internet and dedicated an 
exclusive website, www.vijayinkargil.com to spread their propaganda. Several 
websites (e.g., www.indiainfo.com, www.kargilonline.com) described numerous 
episodes of heroism at the front; supported Indian tactical and strategic 
decisions; updated events in real time, and narrated stories of families of soldiers 
enduring the loss of their loved ones. Trained public relations officers manned 
chat sites on the web. Pakistan, on the other hand, proved unable to launch an 
adequate counter attack on the media front. Even the very obvious Indian lies 
and claims of Vijay or victory could not be exposed. India did not permit media 
personnel to visit Kargil, Dras or Batalik war zone sectors. Zee TV and the 32 
Indian Channels continued their misinformation against Pakistan and Pakistan 
lacked the wherewithal and the will power to tackle them on this extremely 
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2007. Available http://www.pr-society.or.id/artikel4.asp. 
61 RAND Report, Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the 
Kargil Crisis, 2001. 
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volatile front. Obvious lies, such as victory at a strategically important height, 
Tiger Hill, in the Kargil-Dras sector, and the use of tactical aircraft Mirage-2000 
HUD displays with doctored information, were continuously being telecast with 
serious TV News Channels, such as BBC and CNN re-transmitting them.62 The 
tactical and strategic picture the Indians were painting was seen and believed by 
the world. 
The Indians, as a propaganda ploy aimed at the Pakistani public, showed 
TV coverage of their soldiers offering Janaza (funeral) prayers for dead Pakistani 
soldiers. But, unfortunately, they did not do their homework when formulating this 
propaganda and forgot that Muslims do not go into Sajda (prostration) during 
these prayers.63 
On 6 July 1999, the website of Pakistani newspaper “The Dawn” was 
blocked. Two days later a tab appeared on the net announcing “Click here to 
read The Dawn”64 and a filtered and manipulated newspaper was available for 
the readers. 
Some of the themes employed by Indians during Kargil operation to 
malign Pakistan’s image were: 
• Propagated that the Kargil operation was masterminded by top 
army brass and that Pakistani troops were operating under cover 
as Kashmiri Mujahideen.  
• Both the Indian military and media referred to Mujahideen (freedom 
fighters) or Jehadis as Ghusbaityas (intruders).65 It is pertinent to 
mention here, despite the negative connotation the term has in the 
West, traditionally Mujahideen or Jehadis are Muslims fighting for 
just causes, from social issues to military war. These words were 
distorted by the Indians to refer to any military fighter who happens 
to be a Muslim, regardless of the aim of his fight. 
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• Painted India, in various print and television stories, as a nation at 
the front line combating Islamic terrorism. 
• Stated Pakistan committed aggression and was isolated 
internationally. 
• Publicized that Pakistan decided to withdraw due to low morale of 
troops, heavy casualties and mounting international pressure. 
• Stated that Pakistan was not capable of fighting conventional war. 
• In addition to the above: 
• Created victory hype through propaganda. 
• Propagated the concept of Shahadat for Dharti Mata, 
sacrificing one’s life while defending the motherland, to boost 
the morale of Indian troops. 
• Created war hysteria with the help of professional cricket 
players, film actors and other popular personalities. 
I. PAKISTAN MEDIA RESPONSE AND WEAKNESSES 
Pakistani media failed to counter the media invasion launched by India in 
Kargil scenario primarily because they remained ill-informed or not informed at 
all. The first confrontation between the Indian and Pakistan forces took place on 
2 May 1999. However, the Pakistani press was given joint briefings by the 
Minister for Information, Foreign Office Spokesman and the DG Inter-Services 
Public Relations (ISPR) in the third week of May, 1999. And, it was not till mid-
June that Pakistan Television began programs on Kargil, including the military 
aspects.66 
Some of the weaknesses observed in Pakistani media response are 
highlighted as under: 
• Lack of Media Infrastructure. Pakistan lacked requisite media 
infrastructure to respond to the situation. There were only two TV 
channels which were operating with limited coverage outside the 
country. Newspapers gave desired coverage to the issue, but they 
failed to create any impact due to their limited international 
circulation. On the home front, however, they enjoyed more 
credibility than any other media components. 
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• Disorganized Media. The bad effects of lack of requisite media 
infrastructure were more pronounced due to the inability to mobilize 
and organize the available media infrastructure to counter Indian 
propaganda. 
• Absence of Clear and Effective Media Policy. The Pakistan 
media response was directionless due to the absence of any clear 
media policy at the time. No specific theme was created to direct 
the effort in a unified manner. All components of media were found 
to be dealing with the situation according to their own perceptions 
without any coordination. 
• Reactive Nature. The media remained reactive to India 
propaganda. It lacked offensive posture and well coordinated and 
planned themes to raise the morale of the troops or to shield them 
against Indian propaganda.  
• Absence of Committed Correspondents. To have better 
coverage and analysis of the situation and to disseminate the 
desired information to the audience through media there was a 
need to have committed correspondents and trained Public 
Relations Officers working in close harmony with Defense Forces. 
This did not happen. 
• Access and Facilities to Media. Indians provided more access 
and facilities to international media than Pakistan. Reporters were 
helicopter-lifted to forward areas and provided the fax and 
communication resources in field areas. As a result, all war clips 
shown on various satellite channels, including BBC and CNN, were 
found to be filmed in India. This served as a morale booster for 
Indian nation and troops. At the same time, it strengthened Indian 
stance of fighting a retaliatory battle to evict the intruders from their 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Those who do not learn from the history are relegated to become a 
part of the history. 
Sun Tzu 
Perception Management is a core IO capability for 21st century warrior and 
peacekeeper – and for every stage between the two. In today’s environment, PM 
structure, concepts and approaches, coupled with media developments in the 
world, leave this field exposed to be exploited by the adversary. It should be 
treated with high importance as a core IO capability vis-à-vis its current standing 
as a related IO capability in U.S. doctrine. The 1999 Kargil conflict has aptly 
highlighted the fact that information is power and the media; which in fact 
processes, produces and disseminates it, has emerged as a powerful tool. It is 
the strength and the power of the media, which has made it a critical tool of 
Perception Management. 
A. INDO-PAK KARGIL CONFLICT 
The whole Kargil episode was a political victory for India, while from the 
Pakistani perspective, it was a successful tactical operation (albeit one which 
was not accompanied by a coordinated politico-diplomatic plan), it turned into a 
politico-diplomatic setback. The successful end-state was achieved by the 
Indians by employing Perception Management as a core IO capability and, 
therein, using Media as a primary tool to shape favorable domestic and 
international opinion. 
Pakistan’s tactical successes were not translated into strategic gains due 
to the lack of clarity over policy. Hence, there was no Perception Management. 
Thus, while the Kargil episode “showed a tactical ingenuity and boldness in its 
execution – especially given the difficult terrain and inhospitable climatic 
environments … the whole event revealed critical shortcomings and lacunas in 
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the Pakistani political decision-making system … the whole episode was 
essentially a series of incremental steps on both sides, that, in a highly 
combustible politico-diplomatic environment produced a sharp, localised war.”67 
The crux of the Indo-Pak Kargil conflict 1999 was: 
• Kargil - Not a One-Off Operation.  As Musharraf noted, 
“[Kargil was] …… the latest in a series of moves and countermoves 
at a tactical level by India and Pakistan along the Line of Control.” 
When reviewing Kargil conflict, a complete history of injustices that 
Pakistan has been subjected to from the onset at independence in 
1947, also needs to be reviewed. 
• Fear of Indian Aggression and Mujahideen Factor.   Pakistan’s 
sense of historical grievance against India - fueled especially by 
exploitation of an internal crisis in Eastern Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) in 1971, occupation of the Siachen glacier in 1984 
despite the 1972 Simla agreement, planning of a pre-emptive 
attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in the garb of the 1987 
Brasstacks exercise, suppression of the Kashmiri people for 
decades and a series of subsequent incursions and skirmishes 
along the northern Line of Control (LoC) raised the concerns and 
fear of yet another Indian aggression in 1999 in Northern areas. 
Therefore, Pakistani forces took a “forward defense posture across 
the LoC” at a time when Kashmiri Mujahideen had occupied 
vacated Indian winter positions to settle scores with Indians and 
draw them away from the Indian Occupied Kashmir. 
• India - Deadlocked Militarily.  It was the military deadlock that 
forced India to go international in order to seek international 
pressure to get Pakistan to withdraw from the Kargil heights along 
the LoC.  
• Media - “The Tool” For Perception Management.  India was able 
to turn a military defeat into a substantial political / diplomatic 
victory by effectively employing media as “the tool” for Perception 
Management offensive. 
• No Real PM Effort by Pakistan.  Pakistan was unable to translate 
a tremendous military success into a politico-diplomatic victory due 
to the absence of any real Perception Management effort. As 
Mazari notes:  
[During Kargil conflict], the information war was lost 
from the start because of the decision not to inform  
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the public at home [Pakistan] and an equally half-
hearted approach regarding what to give out to the 
international community.68 
B. MEDIA – A FORCE MULTIPLIER 
Media, a key tool of Perception Management, is a force multiplier and a 
weapon of war. Failure to recognize and counter enemy usage of media, as is 
strikingly evident with Pakistan’s Kargil conflict, could lead to avoidable military 
failures and changed outcomes of conflicts. Decisions are no longer based on 
events but on how the events are presented. It is, therefore, important to lay 
greater emphasis on the role of media in war and train for it in peacetime. Strong 
national news agencies are vital for improving each country’s national and 
international reporting.  
The Kargil conflict has, also highlighted the pivotal role media plays in 
changing the final outcome of the conflicts. The most effective way of censoring 
the media is simply to deny them access as was effectively carried out by the 
Indians in Kargil. This can go wrong, as the press can become volatile. The 
Indians got away with it in Kargil by appealing to the Indian media’s sense of 
patriotism. 
Hali notes that “Media Spin” has become a new principle of war.69 “Media 
Spin” is defined as paying close attention to public relations, recognizing that 
public support is an essential ingredient of combat success. At the same time 
one must be cognizant of the fact that media is a vital tool in shaping the 
international opinion. The military must not take media coverage of combat 
operations for granted, and should avoid operations that will alienate public 
support, while ensuring maximum media coverage of success stories: In an age 
where 24-hour instantaneous, battlefield news coverage is a fact of life, paying 
attention to Media Spin is of paramount importance for a combat commander. 
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It is vital to mention here that the use of Perception Management, as a 
core IO capability wherein media is a key tool, is not limited to the Indo-Pak 
scenario. It has all the more relevance in the U.S. context -- especially with 
regards to the war against terrorism. Further research should be done to 
evaluate the use of PM in the war against terrorism.  
C. SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The open society and free press, as in the case of U.S., have their own 
vulnerabilities and the authoritarian states / non-state actors have clear 
advantages in mounting media campaigns. The same can be researched further 
as how U.S., with its open society and free press, is, given the U.S situation in 
the context of the growing need for Perception Management in the war against 
terrorism, even more vulnerable. 
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